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ABSTRACT
Security and privacy of the Internet Domain Name System (DNS)
have been longstanding concerns. Recently, there is a trend to pro-
tect DNS traffic using Transport Layer Security (TLS). However,
at least two major issues remain: (1) how do clients authenticate
DNS-over-TLS endpoints in a scalable and extensible manner; and
(2) how can clients trust endpoints to behave as expected? In this pa-
per, we propose a novel Private DNS-over-TLS (PDoT ) architecture.
PDoT includes a DNS Recursive Resolver (RecRes) that operates
within a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Using Remote Attes-
tation, DNS clients can authenticate, and receive strong assurance
of trustworthiness of PDoT RecRes. We provide an open-source
proof-of-concept implementation of PDoT and use it to experimen-
tally demonstrate that its latency and throughput match that of the
popular Unbound DNS-over-TLS resolver.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Web protocol security; Hardware-
based security protocols; Network security; Privacy protections.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Domain Name System (DNS) [29] is a distributed system that
translates human-readable domain names into IP addresses. It has
been deployed since 1983 and, throughout the years, DNS privacy
has been a major concern.
In 2015, Zhu et al. [39] proposed a DNS design that runs over
Transport Layer Security (TLS) connections [13]. DNS-over-TLS
protects privacy of DNS queries and prevents man-in-the-middle
(MiTM) attacks against DNS responses. [39] also demonstrated the
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practicality of DNS-over-TLS in real-life applications. Several open-
source recursive resolver (RecRes) implementations, including Un-
bound [23] and Knot Resolver [12], currently support DNS-over-
TLS. In addition, commercial support for DNS-over-TLS has been
increasing, e.g., Android P devices [18] and Cloudflare’s 1.1.1.1
RecRes [9]. However, despite attracting interest in both academia
and industry, some problems remain.
The first challenge is how clients authenticate theRecRes. Certificate-
based authentication is natural for websites, since the user (client)
knows the URL of the desired website and the certificate securely
binds this URL to a public key. However, the same approach cannot
be used to authenticate a DNS RecRes because the RecRes does not
have a URL or any other unique long-term user-recognizable iden-
tity that can be included in the certificate. One way to address this
issue is to provide clients with a white-list of trusted RecRes-s’ pub-
lic keys. However, this is neither scalable nor maintainable, because
the white-list would have to include all possible RecRes operators,
ranging from large public services (e.g., 1.1.1.1) to small-scale
providers, e.g., a local RecRes provided by a coffee-shop.
Even if the RecRes can be authenticated, the second major issue
is the lack of means to determine whether a given RecRes is trust-
worthy. For example, even if communication between client stub
(client) and RecRes, and between RecRes and the name server (NS)
is authenticated and encrypted using TLS, the RecResmust decrypt
the DNS query in order to resolve it and contact the relevant NS-s.
This allows the RecRes to learn unencrypted DNS queries, which
poses privacy risks of a malicious RecRes misusing the data, e.g.,
profiling users or selling their DNS data. Some RecRes operators
go to great lengths to assure users that their data is private. For
example, Cloudflare promises “We will never sell your data or use
it to target ads” and goes on to say “We’ve retained KPMG to audit
our systems annually to ensure that we’re doing what we say” [9].
Although helpful, this still requires users to trust the auditor and
can only be used by operators who can afford an auditor.
In this paper, we use Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)
and Remote Attestation (RA) to address these two problems. By using
RA, the identity of the RecRes is no longer relevant, since clients
can check what software a given RecRes is running and make trust
decisions based on how the RecRes behaves. RA is one of the main
features of modern hardware-based TEEs, such as Intel Software
Guard Extensions (SGX) [27] and ARM TrustZone [4]. Such TEEs
are now widely available, with Intel CPUs after the 7th generation
supporting SGX, and ARM Cortex-A CPUs supporting TrustZone.
TEEs with RA capability are also available in cloud services, such
as Microsoft Azure [28]. Specifically, our contributions are:
• We design a Private DNS-over-TLS (PDoT ) architecture, the
main component of which is a privacy-preserving RecRes
that operates within a commodity TEE. Running the RecRes
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inside a TEE prevents even the RecRes operator from learn-
ing clients’ DNS queries, thus providing query privacy. Our
RecRes design addresses the authentication challenge by
enabling clients to trust the RecRes based on how it behaves,
and not on who it claims to be. (See Section 4).
• We implement a proof-of-concept PDoT RecRes using In-
tel SGX and evaluate its security, deployability, and perfor-
mance. All source code and evaluation scripts are publicly
available [21]. Our results show that PDoT handles DNS
queries without leaking information while achieving suffi-
ciently low latency and offering acceptable throughput (See
Sections 5 and 6).
• In order to quantify privacy leakage via traffic analysis, we
performed an Internet measurement study. It shows that
94.7% of the top 1, 000, 000 domain names can be served
from a privacy-preserving NS that serves at least two distinct
domain names, and 65.7% from aNS that serves 100+ domain
names. (See Section 7).
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Domain Name System (DNS)
DNS is a distributed system that translates host and domain names
into IP addresses. DNS includes three types of entities: Client Stub
(client), Recursive Resolver (RecRes), and Name Server (NS). Client
runs on end-hosts. It receives DNS queries from applications, cre-
ates DNS request packets, and sends them to the configured RecRes.
Upon receiving a request, RecRes sends DNS queries to NS-s to re-
solve the query on client’s behalf. When NS receives a DNS query, it
responds to RecReswith either the DNS record that answers client’s
query, or the IP address of the next NS to contact. RecRes thus re-
cursively queries NS-s until the record is found or a threshold is
reached. The NS that holds the queried record is called: Author-
itative Name Server (ANS). After receiving the record from ANS,
RecRes forwards it to client. It is common for RecRes to cache
records so that repeated queries can be handled more efficiently.
2.2 Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is a security primitive
that isolates code and data from privileged software such as the
OS, hypervisor, and BIOS. All software running outside TEE is
considered untrusted. Only code running within TEE can access
data within TEE, thus protecting confidentiality and integrity of
this data against untrusted software. Another typical TEE feature
is remote attestation (RA), which allows remote clients to check
precisely what software is running inside TEE.
One recent TEE example is Intel SGX, which enables applications
to create isolated execution environments called enclaves. The CPU
enforces that only code running within an enclave can access that
enclave’s data. SGX also provides RA functionality.
Memory Security. SGX reserves a portion of memory called
the Enclave Page Cache (EPC). It holds 4KB pages of code and data
associated with specific enclaves. EPC is protected by the CPU
to prevent non-enclave access to this memory region. Execution
threads enter and exit enclaves using SGX CPU instructions, thus
ensuring that in-enclave code execution can only begin from well-
defined call gates. From a software perspective, untrusted code can
make ECALLs to invoke enclave functions, and enclave code can
make OCALLs to invoke untrusted functions outside the enclave.
Attestation Service. SGX provides two types of attestation:
local and remote. Local attestation enables one enclave to attest
another (running on the same machine) to verify that the latter
is a genuine enclave actually running on the same CPU. Remote
attestation involves more entities. First, an application enclave to be
attested creates a report that summarizes information about itself,
e.g., code it is running. This report is sent to a special enclave, called
quoting enclave which is provided by Intel and available on all SGX
machines. Quoting enclave confirms that requesting application
enclave is running on the same machine and returns a quote, which
is a report with the quoting enclave’s signature. The application
enclave sends this quote to the Intel Attestation Service (IAS) and
obtains an attestation verification report. This is signed by the IAS
confirming that the application enclave is indeed a genuine SGX
enclave running the code it claims. Upon receiving an attestation
verification report, the verifier can make an informed trust decision
about the behavior of the attested enclave.
Side-Channel Attacks. SGX is vulnerable to side-channel at-
tacks [24, 36], and various mechanisms have been proposed [11, 32,
34] to mitigate them. Since defending against side-channel attacks
is orthogonal to our work, we expect that a production implemen-
tation would include relevant mitigation mechanisms.
3 ADVERSARY MODEL & REQUIREMENTS
3.1 Adversary Model
The adversary’s goal is to learn, or infer, information about DNS
queries sent by clients. We consider two types of adversaries, based
on their capabilities:
The first type is a malicious RecRes operator who has full control
over the physical machine, its OS and all applications, including
RecRes. We assume that the adversary cannot break any crypto-
graphic primitives, assuming that they are correctly implemented.
We also assume that it cannot physically attack hardware compo-
nents, e.g., probe CPU physically to learn TEE secrets. This ad-
versary also controls all of RecRes’s communication interfaces,
allowing it to drop/delay packets, measure the time required for
query processing, and observe all cleartext packet headers. The
second type is a network adversary, which is strictly weaker than
the malicious RecRes operator. In the passive case, this adversary
can observe any packets that flow into and out of RecRes. In the
active case, this adversary can modify and forge network pack-
ets. DNS-over-TLS alone (without PDoT ) is sufficient to thwart
a passive network adversary. However, since an active adversary
could redirect clients to a malicious RecRes, clients need an efficient
mechanism to authenticate the RecRes and determine whether it is
trustworthy, which is the main contribution of PDoT .
We do not consider Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks on RecRes,
since these do not help to achieve either adversary’s goal of learning
clients’ DNS queries. Connection-oriented RecRes-s can defend
against DoS attacks using cookie-based mechanisms to prevent
SYN flooding [39].
3.2 System Requirements
We define the following requirements for the overall system:
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R1: Query Privacy. Contents of client’s query (specifically, do-
main name to be resolved) should not be learned by the
adversary. Ideally, payload of the DNS packets should be
encrypted. However, even if packets are encrypted, their
headers leak information, such as source and destination IP
addresses. In Section 7.1, we quantify the amount of infor-
mation that can be learned via traffic analysis.
R2: Deployability. Clients using a privacy-preserving RecRes
should require no special hardware. Minimal software modi-
fications should be imposed. Also, for the purpose of transi-
tion and compatibility, a privacy-preserving RecRes should
be able to interact with legacy clients that only support un-
modified DNS-over-TLS.
R3: Response Latency. A privacy-preserving RecRes should
achieve similar response latency to that of a regular RecRes.
R4: Scalability. A privacy-preserving RecRes should process a
realistic volume of queries generated by a realistic number
of clients.
Note: query privacy guarantees provided by PDoT rely on the
forward-looking assumption that communication between RecRes
and respective NS-s is also protected by DNS-over-TLS. The DNS
Privacy (DPrive) Working Group is working towards a standard for
encryption and authentication of DNS resolver-to-ANS communi-
cation [6], using essentially the same mechanism as DNS-over-TLS.
We expect an increasing number of NS-s to begin supporting this
standard in the near future. Once PDoT is enabled at the RecRes,
it can provide incremental query privacy for queries served from
a DNS-over-TLS NS. As discussed in Section 5, with small design
modifications, PDoT can be adapted for use in NS-s.
4 SYSTEM MODEL & DESIGN CHALLENGES
4.1 PDoT System Model
Figure 1 shows an overview of PDoT . It includes four types of enti-
ties: client, RecRes, TEE, NS-s. We now summarize PDoT operation,
reflected in the figure: (1) After initial start-up, TEE creates an at-
testation report. (2) When client initiates a secure TLS connection,
the attestation report is sent from RecRes to the client alongside all
other information required to setup a secure connection. (3) Client
authenticates and attests RecRes by verifying the attestation report.
It checks whether RecRes is running inside a genuine TEE and
running trusted code. (4) Client proceeds with the rest of the TLS
handshake procedure only if verification succeeds. (5) Client sends
a DNS query to RecRes through the secure TLS channel it has just
set up. (6) RecRes receives a DNS query from client, decrypts it into
TEE memory, and learns the domain name that the client wants to
resolve. (7) RecRes sets up a secure TLS channel to the appropriate
NS in order to resolve the query. (8) RecRes sends a DNS query to
NS over that channel. If NS’s reply includes an IP address of the
next NS, RecRes sets up another TLS channel to that NS. This is
done repeatedly, until RecRes successfully resolves the name to an
IP address. (9) Once RecRes obtains the final answer, it sends this
to client over the secure channel. Client can reuse the TLS channel
for future queries.
Note that we assume RecRes is not under the control of the
user. In some cases, users could run their own RecRes-s, which
would side-step the concerns about query privacy. For example,
Figure 1: Overview of the proposed system.
modern home routers are sufficiently powerful to run an in-house
RecRes. However, this approach cannot be used in public networks
(e.g., airports or coffee shop WiFi networks), which are the target
scenarios for PDoT .
4.2 Design Challenges
The following key challenges were encountered in the process of
PDoT ’s design:
C1: TEE Limited Functionality. In order to satisfy their secu-
rity requirements, TEE-s often limit the functionality avail-
able to code that runs within them. One example is the in-
ability to fork within the TEE. Forking a process running
inside the TEE forces the child process to run outside the
TEE, breaking RecRes security guarantees. Another example
is that system calls, such as socket communication, cannot
be made from within the TEE.
C2: TEE Memory Limitations. A typical TEE has a relatively
small amount of memory. Although an SGX enclave can
theoretically have a large amount of in-enclave memory,
this will require page swapping of EPC pages. The pages
to be swapped must be encrypted and integrity protected
in order to meet the security requirements of SGX. There-
fore, page swapping places a heavy burden on performance.
To avoid page swapping, enclave size should be less than
the size of the EPC – typically, 128MB. Since RecRes is a
performance-critical application, its size should ideally not
exceed 128MB. This limit negatively impactsRecRes through-
put, as it bounds the number of threads that can be spawned
in a TEE.
C3: TEE Call-in/Call-out Overhead. Applications requiring
functionality that is not available within the TEEmust switch
to the non-TEE side. This introduces additional overhead,
both from the switching itself, and from the need to flush and
reload CPU caches. Identifying and minimizing the number
of times RecRes switches back and forth (whilst keeping
RecRes functionality correct) is a substantial challenge.
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Figure 2: Overview of PDoT implementation.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
Figure 2 shows an overview of the PDoT design. Since our design is
architecture-independent, it can be implemented on any TEE archi-
tecture that provides the features outlined in Section 2.2. We chose
the off-the-shelf Intel SGX as the platform for the proof-of-concept
PDoT implementation in order to conduct an accurate performance
evaluation on real hardware. (See Section 6). Therefore, our imple-
mentation is subject to performance and memory constraints in the
current version of Intel SGX, and is thus best suited for small-scale
networks, e.g., the public WiFi network provided of a typical coffee
shop. However, as TEE technology advances, we expect that our
design will scale to larger networks.
5.1 PDoT
PDoT consists of two parts: (1) trusted part residing in TEE enclaves,
and (2) untrusted part that operates in the non-TEE region. The
former is responsible for resolving DNS queries, and the latter –
for accepting incoming connections, assigning file descriptors to
sockets, and sending/receiving data received from the trusted part.
Enclave Startup Process.When the application enclave starts,
it generates a new public-private key-pair within the enclave. It
then creates a report that summarizes enclave and platform state.
The report includes a SHA256 hash of the entire code that is sup-
posed to run in the enclave (called MRENCLAVE value) and other
attributes of the target enclave. PDoT also includes a SHA256 hash
of the previously generated public key in the report. The report
is then passed on to the SGX quoting enclave to receive a quote.
The quoting enclave signs the report and thus generates a quote,
which cryptographically binds the public key to the application
enclave. The quoting enclave sends the quote to the application
enclave, which forwards it to the Intel Attestation Service (IAS)
to obtain an attestation verification report. It can be used in the
future by clients to verify the link between the public key and the
MRENCLAVE value. After receiving the attestation verification re-
port from IAS, the application enclave prepares a self-signed X.509
certificate required for the TLS handshake. In addition to the public
key, the certificate includes: (1) attestation verification report, (2)
attestation verification report signature, and (3) attestation report
signing certificate, extracted from (1). MRENCLAVE value and hash
of public key are enclosed in the attestation verification report.
TLS Handshake Process.1 Once the application enclave is cre-
ated, PDoT can create TLS connections and accept DNS queries
from clients. The client initiates a TLS handshake process by send-
ing a message to PDoT . This message is captured by untrusted part
of PDoT and triggers the following events.2 First, untrusted part
of PDoT tells the application enclave to create a new TLS object
within the enclave for this incoming connection. This forces the
TLS endpoint to reside inside the enclave. The TLS object is then
connected to the socket where the client is waiting to be served.
RecRes then exchanges several messages with the client, including
the self-signed certificate that was created in the previous section.
Having received the certificate from RecRes, the client authenti-
cates RecRes and validates the certificate. (For more detail, see
Section 5.2). Only if the authentication and validation succeed, the
client resumes the handshake process.
DNS Query Resolving Process. The client sends a DNS query
over the TLS channel established above. Upon receiving the query,
RecRes decrypts it within the application enclave and obtains the
target domain name. RecRes begins to resolve the name starting
from root NS, by doing the following repeatedly: 1) set up a TLS
channel with NS, 2) send DNS queries and receive replies via that
channel. Once RecRes receives the answer from NS, RecRes returns
it to the client over the original TLS channel.
Figure 3 illustrates how PDoT divides DNS query resolution
process into three threads: (1) receiving DNS query – ClientReader,
1In implementing this process, we heavily relied on SGX RA TLS [20] whitepaper.
2Since we consider a malicious RecRes operator, it has an option not to trigger these
events. However, clients will notice that their queries are not being answered and can
switch to a different RecRes.
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Figure 3: Overview of PDoT threading model.
(2) resolving it – QueryHandler, and (3) returning the answer –
ClientWriter.
ClientReader and ClientWriter threads are spawned anew upon
each query. Dividing receiving and sending processes and giving
them a dedicated thread is helpful because many clients send mul-
tiple DNS queries within a short timespan without waiting for the
answer to the previous query.3 When ClientReader thread receives
a DNS query from the client, it stores the query and a client ID in a
FIFO queue, called inQueryList.
QueryHandler threads are spawned when PDoT starts up. The
number of QueryHandler threads is configured by RecRes operator.
QueryHandler threads are shared among all current ClientReader
and ClientWriter threads. When a QueryHandler thread detects an
entry in the inQueryList, it removes this entry and retrieves the
query and the client ID. QueryHandler first checks whether this
client is still accepting answers from RecRes. If not, QueryHandler
simply ignores this query and moves on to the next one. If the client
is still accepting answers, QueryHandler resolves the query and
puts the answer into a FIFO queue (called outQueryList) dedicated
to that specific client.
In some cases, NS response might be too slow. When that hap-
pens, QueryHandler thread gives up on resolving that particular
query and moves on to the next query, since it is very likely that
the request was dropped. This also prevents resources (such as
mutex) from being locked up by this QueryHandler thread. In our
implementation, this timeout was set to be the same as the client’s
timeout, since there is no point in sending the answer to the client
after that.
Once an answer is added to outQueryList dedicated to its client,
ClientWriter uses that answer to compose a DNS reply packet and
sends it to the client. The reason we have N outQueryLists for N
clients is to improve performance. With only one outQueryList,
ClientWriter threads must search through the queue to find the
answer for the connected client. This takes O(M × N ) time, where
N is the number of clients and M is the number of queries each
client sends. Instead, with N outQueryLists, we reduce complexity
toO(1) because ClientWriter thread merely selects the query at the
head of the list.
Caching. Some DNS recursive resolvers can cache query results.
Caching is beneficial from the client’s perspective, since, in case
of a cache hit, the RecRes can answer immediately, thus reducing
query latency. The RecRes also benefits from not having to estab-
lish connections to external NS-s. However, irrespective of how
3For example, a client has received a webpage that includes images and advertisements
that are served from servers located at different domains. This triggers multiple DNS
queries at the same time.
it is implemented, caching at the RecRes causes potential privacy
leaks, e.g., timings can reveal whether a certain domain record was
already in the cache. This is an orthogonal challenge, discussed in
Section 7.2.
To explore caching in a privacy-preserving resolver, we imple-
mented a simple in-enclave cache for PDoT . It uses a red-black tree
data structure and stores all records associated with the clients’
queries, indexed by the queried domain. This results in O(loд2(N ))
access times with N entries in the cache. In practice, PDoT could
also use current techniques to mitigate against side-channel attacks
on cache’s memory access patterns, e.g., [10, 31, 34]. During remote
attestation, clients can ascertain whether the resolver has enabled
caching, and which mitigations it uses.
PDoT ANS with TEE support. With minor design changes,
PDoT RecRes design can be modified for use as an ANS. Similar to
the caching mechanism described above, an PDoT ANS can look up
the answers to queries in an internal database, rather than contact
externalNS-s. The same way that clients authenticate PDoT RecRes,
the RecRes can authenticate the PDoT ANS. Clients can thus estab-
lish trust in both RecRes and ANS using transitive attestation [2].
5.2 Client with PDoT Support
We took the Stubby client stub from the getdns project [22] which
offers DNS-over-TLS support and modified it to perform remote
attestation during the TLS handshake. We now describe how the
client verifies its RecRes, decides whether the RecRes is trusted,
and emits the DNS request packet.
RecRes Verification. After receiving a DNS request from an
application, the client first checks whether there is an existing TLS
connection to its RecRes. If so, the client reuses it. If not, it attempts
to establish a new connection. During the handshake, the client
receives a certificate from RecRes, from which it extracts: 1) attesta-
tion verification report, 2) attestation verification report signature,
and 3) attestation report signing certificate. This certificate is self-
signed by IAS and we assume that the client trusts it. From (3), the
client first retrieves the IAS public key and, using it, verifies (2).
Then, the client extracts the SHA256 hash of RecRes’s public key
from (1) and verifies it against a copy from (3). This way, the client
is assured that RecRes is indeed running in a genuine SGX enclave
and uses this public key for the TLS connection.
Trust Decision. The client also extracts the MRENCLAVE value
from (1), which it compares against the list of acceptable MREN-
CLAVE values. If the MRENCLAVE value is not listed or one of the
verification steps fail, the client stub aborts the handshake, moves
on to the next RecRes, and re-starts the process. Note that the trust
decision process is different from the normal TLS trust decision
process. Normally, a TLS server-side certificate binds the public key
to one or more URLs and organization names. However, by binding
the MRENCLAVE value with the public key, the clients can trust
RecRes based on its behavior, and not its organization (recall that
the MRENCLAVE value is a hash of RecRes code). There several op-
tions for deciding which MRENCLAVE values are trustworthy. For
example, vendors could publish lists of expected MRENCLAVE val-
ues for their resolvers. For open-source resolvers like PDoT , anyone
can re-compute the expected MRENCLAVE value by recompiling
the software, assuming a reproducible build process. This would
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allow trusted third parties (e.g., auditors) to inspect the source code,
ascertain that it upholds required privacy guarantees, and publish
their own lists of trusted MRENCLAVE values.
Sending DNS request. Once the TLS connection is established,
the client sends the DNS query to RecRes over the TLS tunnel. If
it does not receive a response from RecRes within the specified
timeout, it assumes that there is a problem with RecRes and sends a
DNS reply message to the application with an error code SERVFAIL.
5.3 Overcoming Technical Challenges
As discussed in Section 4.2, PDoT faced three main challenges,
which we addressed as follows:
LimitedTEEFunctionality.The inability to use sockets within
the TEE is a challenge because the RecRes cannot communicate
with the outside world. We address this issue by having a process
running outside the TEE, as described in Section 5.1. This process
forwards packets from the client to TEE through ECALLs and sends
packets received from TEE via OCALLs. However, this processes
might redirect the packet to a malicious process or simply drop it.
We discuss this issue in Section 6.1. Another function unavailable
within TEE is forking a process. PDoT uses pthreads instead of
forking to run multiple tasks concurrently in a TEE.
Limited TEE Memory. We use several techniques to address
this challenge. First, we ensure no other enclaves (other than the
quoting enclave) run on RecRes machine. This allows PDoT to use
all available EPC memory. Second, we fix the number of Query-
Handler threads in order to save space. This is possible because of
dis-association of QueryHandler and ClientReader/Writer threads.
OCALL and ECALL Overhead. ECALLs and OCALLs intro-
duce overhead and therefore should be avoided as much as possible.
For example, all threads mentioned in the previous section must
wait until they receive the following information: for ClientReader
thread – DNS query from the client, for QueryProcessor thread –
query from inQueryList, and for ClientWriter thread – response
from outQueryList. PDoT was implemented so that these threads
wait inside the enclave. If we were to wait outside the enclave, we
would have to use an ECALL to enter the enclave each time the
thread proceeds.
6 EVALUATION
6.1 Security Analysis
This section describes how query privacy (Requirement R1) is
achieved, with respect to the two types of adversaries, per Sec-
tion 3.1.
Malicious RecRes operator. Recall that a malicious RecRes
operator controls the machine that runs PDoT RecRes. It cannot
obtain the query from intercepted packets since they flow over
the encrypted TLS channel. Also, because the local TLS endpoint
resides inside the RecRes enclave, the malicious operator cannot
retrieve the query from the enclave, as it does not have access to
the protected memory region.
However, a malicious RecRes operator may attempt to connect
the socket to a malicious TLS server that resides in either: 1) an
untrusted region, or 2) a separate enclave that the operator itself
created. If the operator can trick the client into establishing a TLS
connection with the malicious TLS server, the adversary can obtain
the plaintext DNS queries. For case (1), the verification step at the
client side fails because the TLS server certificate does not include
any attestation information. For case (2), the malicious enclave
might receive a legitimate attestation verification report, attesta-
tion verification report signature, and attestation report signing
certificate from IAS. However, that report would contain a different
MRENCLAVE value, which would be rejected by the client. To con-
vince the client to establish a connection with PDoT RecRes, the
adversary has no choice except to run the code of PDoT RecRes.
Therefore, in both cases, the adversary cannot trick the client into
establishing a TLS connection with a TLS server other than the one
running a PDoT RecRes.
Network Adversary. Recall that this adversary captures all
packets to/from PDoT . It cannot obtain the plaintext queries since
they flow over the TLS tunnel. The only information it can obtain
from packets includes cleartext header fields, such as source and
destination IP addresses. This information, coupled with a timing
attack, might let the adversary correlate a packet sent from the
client with a packet sent to an NS. The consequent amount of
privacy leakage is discussed in Section 7.1
6.2 Deployability
Section 5 shows how PDoT clients do not need special hardware,
and require only minor software modifications (Requirement R2).
To aid deployability, PDoT also provides several configurable pa-
rameters, including: the number of QueryHandle threads (to adjust
throughput), the amount of memory dedicated to each thread (to
serve clients that send a lot of queries at a given time), and the time-
out of QueryHandle threads (to adjust the time for a QueryHandle
thread to acquire a resource). Another consideration is incremental
deployment, where some clients may request DNS-over-TLS with-
out supporting PDoT . PDoT can handle this situation by having
its TLS certificate also signed by a trusted root CA, since legacy
clients will ignore PDoT -specific attestation information.
On the client side, an ideal deployment scenario would be for
browser or OS vendors to update their client stubs to support PDoT .
The same way that browser vendors currently include and maintain
a list of trusted root CA certificates in their browsers, they could
include and periodically update a list of trustworthy MRENCLAVE
values for PDoT resolvers. This could all be done transparently to
end users. As with root CA certificates, expert users can manually
add/remove trusted MRENCLAVE values for their own systems. In
practice, there are only a handful of recursive resolver software
implementations. Thus, even allowing for multiple versions of each,
the list of trusted MRENCLAVE values would be orders of magni-
tude smaller than the list of public keys of every trusted resolver,
as would be required for standard DNS-over-TLS.
6.3 Performance Evaluation
We ran PDoT on a low-cost Intel NUC consisting of an Intel Pentium
Silver J5005 CPU with 128 MB of EPC memory and 4 GB of RAM.
We used Ubuntu 16.04 and the Intel SGX SDK version 2.2. We
configured our RecRes to support up to 50 concurrent clients and
process queries using 30 QueryHandle threads. For comparison, we
performed the same benchmarks using Unbound [23], a popular
open source RecRes.
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Figure 4: Latency comparison of PDoT and Unbound
6.3.1 Latency Evaluation. The objective of our latency evaluation is
to assess overhead introduced by running RecRes inside an enclave.
To do so, we measure the time to resolve a DNS query using PDoT
and compare with Unbound. To meet requirement R3, PDoT should
not incur a significant increase in latency compared to Unbound.
Experimental Setup. The client and RecRes ran on the same
physical machine to remove network delay. We conducted the
experiment using PDoT and Unbound as the RecRes, and Stubby
as the client. We measured latency under two different scenarios:
cold start and warm start. In the former, the client sets up a new
TLS connection every time it sends a query to the RecRes. In the
warm start scenario, the client sets up one TLS connection with the
RecRes at the beginning, and reuses it throughout the experiment.
In other words, the cold start measurements also include the time
required to establish the TLS connection. In this experiment, the
caching mechanisms of both PDoT and Unbound were disabled.
We created a python program to feed DNS queries to the client.
The program sends 100 queries sequentially for ten different do-
mains. That is, the program waits for an answer to the previous
query before sending the next query. We used the top ten domains
of the Majestic Million domain list [26].
The python program measures the time between sending the
query and receiving an answer. For the cold start experiment, we
spawned a new Stubby client and established a new TLS connection
for each query. In the warm start scenario, we first established the
TLS connection by sending a query for another domain (not in the
top ten), but did not include this in the timing measurement.
Note that the numeric latency values are specific to our experi-
mental setup because they depend on network bandwidth of our
RecRes, and latency between the latter and relevant NS-s. The im-
portant aspect of this experiment is the ratio between the latencies
of PDoT and Unbound. Therefore it is not meaningful to compute
average latency over a large set of domains. Instead, we took mul-
tiple measurements for each of a small set of domains (e.g., 100
measurements for each of 10 domains) so as to analyse the range
of response latencies for each domain.
Results and observations. Results of latency measurements
are are shown in Figure 4. Red boxes show latency of PDoT and
the blue boxes – of Unbound. In these plots, boxes span from the
lower to upper quartile values of collected data. Whiskers span
from the highest datum within the 1.5 interquartile range (IQR) of
the upper quartile to the lowest datum within the 1.5 IQR of the
lower quartile. Median values are shown as black horizontal lines
inside the boxes.
For the cold-start case in Figure 4a, althoughUnbound is typically
faster than our proof-of-concept PDoT implementation, the range
of latencies is similar. For 7 out of 10 domains, the upper whisker
of PDoT was lower than that of Unbound. Overall, PDoT shows
an average 22% overhead compared to Unbound in the cold-start
setting.
For the warm-start case in Figure 4b, the median latency is lower
across the board compared to the cold-start setting because the TLS
tunnel has already been established. In this setting, PDoT shows
an average of 9% overhead compared to Unbound. In practice, once
the client has established a connection to RecRes, it will maintain
this connection; thus, the vast majority of queries will see only the
warm-start latency.
6.3.2 Throughput evaluation. The objective of throughput evalu-
ation is to measure the rate at which the RecRes can sustainably
respond to queries. PDoT ’s throughput should be close to that of
Unbound to satisfy requirement R4.
Experiment setup. The client and RecReswere run on different
machines, so that the RecRes could use all available resources of a
single machine. This is representative of a local RecRes running in
a small network (e.g., a coffee shop WiFi network). We conducted
this experiment using the same two RecRes-s as in the latency
experiment. Stubby was configured to reuse TLS connections. To
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Figure 5: Throughput comparison of PDoT (red) and Unbound (blue)
simulate a small to medium-scale network, we varied the number of
concurrent clients between 1 and 25 and adjusted the query arrival
rate from 5 to 100 queries per second. Query rates were uniformly
distributed among the clients, e.g., for an overall rate of 100 queries
per second with 10 clients, each client sends 10 queries per second.
To eliminate any variability in resolving the query, all queries were
for the domain google.com. We maintained constant query rate
for one minute. Caching mechanisms of both PDoT and Unbound
were disabled.
Results and observations. Results of throughput experiments
are shown in Figure 5. Each graph corresponds to a different number
of clients. Horizontal axis shows different query rates and vertical
axis shows the range of response latencies for each query rate.
Measurement are plotted using the same box plot arrangement as
in latency evaluation. Blue boxes show results for Unbound and
red boxes – for PDoT .
If queries arrive faster than RecRes can process them, they start
clogging the queue, and the latency of each successive response
increases as the queue grows. In this case, the average latency
continues to increase indefinitely until queries begin to timeout or
RecRes runs out of memory. We view this rate of query arrival as
unsustainable. On the other hand, if RecRes can sustain the rate
of query arrival, average response latency would remain roughly
constant irrespective of how long RecRes runs. For this experiment,
we define a sustainable rate of query arrival as the one for which
the average response latency is constant over time, and below
one second – well below a typical DNS client timeout. Figure 5
only shows cases where query arrival rate is sustainable for the
respective RecRes. In other words, the presence of a box in Figure 5
shows that the RecRes can achieve that level of throughput.
Surprisingly, we observed that Unbound cannot handle query
rates exceeding 10 queries per second per client, i.e., its maximum
sustainable rate was 10n queries per second distributed among
n clients. This is because Unbound’s design only uses one query
processing thread per client. In contrast, PDoT handled more than
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Figure 6: Latency comparison of PDoT (red) and Unbound (blue) with different number of domains in cache
100 queries per second in all cases because its design uses a separate
pool of QueryHandle threads.
Overall, Figure 5 confirms that our proof-of-concept implemen-
tation achieves at least the same throughput as Unbound across
the range of clients and query arrival rates, and can achieve higher
throughput when the number of clients is low. Although Unbound
again achieves slightly lower latency, this is consistent with our
latency measurements in Section 6.3.1 and is likely due to the fact
that Unbound is an optimized production-grade RecRes.
6.3.3 Caching evaluation. We evaluated performance of both re-
solvers with caching enabled; Unbound with its default caching
behavior, and PDoT with our simple proof-of-concept cache.
Experiment setup. The experimental setup is similar to that of
the latency evaluation described earlier.We pre-populated resolvers’
caches with varying numbers of domains and measured response
latency for a representative set of 10 popular domains.
Results and observations. As shown in Figure 6, Unbound
serves responses from cache with a consistent latency irrespective
of the number of entries in the cache. Although PDoT achieves
lower average latencies when the cache is relatively empty, it has
higher variability than Unbound. This is probably due to the com-
bination of our unoptimized caching implementation and latency
of accessing enclave memory. Nevertheless, Figure 6 shows that –
even with the memory limitations of current hardware enclaves –
PDoT can still benefit from caching a small number of domains.
7 DISCUSSION
7.1 Information Revealed by IP Addresses
Even if the connections between the client, RecRes, and NS-s are
encrypted using TLS, some information is still leaked. The most
prominent and obvious is source/destination IP addresses. The
network adversary described in Section 3.1 can combine these
cleartext IP addresses with packet timing information in order
to correlate packets sent from client to RecRes with subsequent
packets sent from RecRes to NS.
Armed with this information, the adversary can narrow down
the client’s domain name query to one of the records that could
be served by that specific ANS. Assuming the ANS can serve R
domain names, the adversary has a 1/R probability of guessing
which domain name the user queried. When R > 1, we call this
a privacy-preserving ANS. This prompts two questions: 1) what
percentage of domains can be answered by a privacy-preserving
ANS; and 2) what is the typical size of anonymity set (R) provided
by a privacy-preserving ANS?
To answer these questions, we designed a scheme to collect
records stored in various ANS-s. We sent DNS queries for 1,000,000
domains from the Majestic Million domain list [26], and gathered
information about ANS-s that can possibly provide the answer for
each. By collecting data on possible ANS-s, we can map domain
names to eachANS, and thus estimate the number of records held by
each ANS. Following the Guidelines for Internet Measurement Activ-
ities [8], we limited our querying rate, in order to avoid placing un-
due load on any servers. As shown in Figure 7, only 5.7% of domains
we queriedwere served by non-privacy-preservingANS-s, i.e., those
that hold only one record). Examples of domain names served from
non-privacy-preserving ANS-s included: tinyurl.com4, bing.com,
nginx.org, news.bbc.co.uk, and cloudflare.com. On the other
hand, 9 out of 10 queries were served by a privacy-preserving ANS,
and 65.7% by ANS-s that hold over 100 records.
These results are still approximations. Since we do not have data
for domains outside theMajesticMillion list, we cannot make claims
about whether these would be served by a privacy-preserving ANS.
We hypothesize that the vast majority of ANS-s would be privacy-
preserving for the simple reason that it is more economical to
amortize the ANS’s running costs over multiple domains. On the
other hand, we can be certain that our results for the Majestic
Million are a strict lower bound on the level of privacy because
the ANS-s from which these are served could also be serving other
domains outside of our list. It would be possible to arrive at a
more accurate estimate by analyzing zone files of all (or at least
most) ANS-s. However, virtually all ANS-s disable the interface
to download zone files because this could be used to mount DoS
attacks. Therefore, this type of analysis would have to be performed
by an organization with privileged access to all ANS-s’ zone files.
4Since tinyurl.com is a URL shortening service, this is actually still privacy-preserving
because the adversary can not learn which short URL was queried.
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Figure 7: Percentage of Majestic Million domains answered
by an ANS with at least N records
7.2 Caching & Timing attacks
Introducing a cache into an RecRes would allow the adversary to
launch timing attacks and help guess the domain name queried by
the end-user. We consider two types of timing attacks:
• Measuring time between query and response. This is
the simplest attack, whereby the adversary monitors the
network between client and RecRes, and records the time for
the RecRes to respond to the client. If the response time is
shorter (compared to other queries), it likely has been served
from a cache. This attack can be launched by both adversary
types described in Section 3.1. One obvious countermeasure
is to artificially delay the response to match the latency of
NS-served responses.
• Correlating client and RecRes requests. To counter the
above countermeasure the adversary may attempt to cor-
relate DNS requests sent from client to RecRes with those
sent from RecRes to NS-s e.g., using the times at which the
packets were sent. If successful, the adversary can distin-
guish requests that involve contacting an NS from those that
were served from the cache. This attack can be also launched
by a malicious RecRes or a network sniffer. One way to
counter this is to always send a query to one NS (although
not necessarily the correct NS). This diminishes the benefits
of caching, but still reduces the number of NS queries since
the real answer may have required more than one NS query.
Another way is to batch and randomize the order of requests
to the NS, creating a type of DNS mix network.
For both of these types of attacks, the information leakage de-
pends on whether the adversary is passive or active. A passive
adversary can (at most) guess the domain name. If the caching strat-
egy is Most Recently Used (MRU), the domain name must be one of
the popular ones. The active adversary can generate its own DNS
queries for a wide range of domain names and keep a list of those
that result in cache hits, thus improving the chances of inferring
the user’s query target.
8 RELATEDWORK
There has been much prior work aiming to protect the privacy of
DNS queries [7, 15, 16, 25, 33, 37, 38]. For example, Lu et al. [25]
proposed a privacy-preserving DNS that uses distributed hash ta-
bles, different naming schemes, and methods from computational
private information retrieval. Federrath et al. [16] introduced a ded-
icated DNS Anonymity Service to protect the DNS queries using an
architecture that distributes the top domains by broadcast and uses
low-latency mixes for requesting the remaining domains. These
schemes all assume that all parties involved do not act maliciously.
There have also been some activities in the Internet standards
community that focused on DNS security and privacy. DNS Secu-
rity Extensions (DNSSEC) [3] provides data origin authentication
and integrity via public key cryptography. However, it does not
offer privacy. Bortzmeyer [5] proposed a scheme Also, though not
Internet standards, several protocols have been proposed to encrypt
and authenticates DNS packets between the client and the RecRes
(DNSCrypt [30]) and RecRes and NS-s (DNSCurve [1]). Moreover,
the original DNS-over-TLS paper has been converted into a draft
Internet standard [19]. All these methods assume that the RecRes
operator is trusted and does not attempt to learn anything from the
DNS queries.
Furthermore, there has been some research on establishing trust
through TEEs to protect confidentiality and integrity of network
functions. Specifically, SGX has been used to protect network func-
tions, especially middle-boxes. For example, Endbox [17] aims to
distribute middle-boxes to client edges: clients connect through
VPN to ensure confidentiality of their traffic while remaining main-
tainable. LightBox [14] is another middle-box that runs in an en-
clave; its goal is to protect the client’s traffic from the third-party
middle-box service provider while maintaining adequate perfor-
mance. Finally, ShieldBox [35] aims to protect confidential network
traffic that flows through untrusted commodity servers and pro-
vides a generic interface for easy deployability. These efforts focus
on protecting confidential data that flows in the network, and do
not target DNS queries.
9 CONCLUSION & FUTUREWORK
This paper proposed PDoT , a novel DNS RecRes design that oper-
ates within a TEE to protect privacy of DNS queries, even from a
malicious RecRes operator. In terms of query throughput, our unop-
timized proof-of-concept implementation matches the throughput
of Unbound, a state-of-the-art DNS-over-TLS recursive resolver,
while incurring an acceptable increase in latency (due to the use
of a TEE). In order to quantify the potential for privacy leakage
through traffic analysis, we performed an Internet measurement
study which showed that 94.7% of the top 1,000,000 domain names
can be served from a privacy-preserving ANS that serves at least two
distinct domain names, and 65.7% from an ANS that serves 100+ do-
main names. As future work, we plan to port the Unbound RecRes
to Intel SGX and conduct a performance comparison with PDoT ,
as well as to explore methods for improving PDoT ’s performance
using caching while maintaining client privacy.
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